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POSITIVISM REGAINED,
NIHILISM POSTPONED
G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. United
States: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993. xvi + 343 pp.
Reviewed by Jose E. Alvarez*
Don't be fooled by the innocuous title of this book. Notwithstanding
the author's claim to open-ended, scholarly inquiry, this book, the latest
in the prestigious Developments in InternationalLaw series by Martinus
Nijhoff,' is best read as a brief for positivism - and a well-written,
provocative one at that. This book is a polemic disguised as a hornbook.
The author, a positivist in the classic mode,2 is waging a war against the
powers of darkness, be they represented in the form of such old enemies
as natural lawyers, or Yale policy-school adherents, or newer enemies,

like the Crits. His battle is a familiar one: he wants to rescue the
positivist doctrine of the sources of international law from the threats
* Professor of Law, Michigan Law School. Harvard University, A.B. (1977); Oxford
University, B.A. (1979); Harvard University, J.D. (1981). The author thanks his ever-faithful,
ever-diligent editor, Susan Damplo, for her efforts.
1. Prior books in the series include THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (R.St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1986) [hereinafter STRUCTURE AND
PROCESS],

and

OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

(1991).

2. While there are as many definitions of positivism as there are positivists, among the
classic descriptions is H.L.A. Hart's. Hart identified five meanings of positivism:
(1) the contention that laws are commands of human beings,
(2) the contention that there is no necessary connection between law and morals, or
law as it is and ought to be,
(3) the contention that the analysis (or study of the meaning) of legal concepts is (a)
worth pursuing and (b) to be distinguished from historical inquiries into the causes
or origins of laws, from sociological inquiries into the relation of law and other
social phenomena, and from the criticism or appraisal of law whether in terms of
morals, social aims, "functions," or otherwise,
(4) the contention that a legal system is a "closed logical system" in which correct
legal decisions can be deduced by logical means from predetermined legal rules
without reference to social aims, policies, moral standards, and
(5) the contention that moral judgments cannot be established or defended, as
statements of facts can, by rational argument, evidence, or proof ("noncognitivism"
in ethics).
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 601-02
n.25 (1958) (citations omitted). As will become evident, Danilenko's views generally adhere
to these tenets, suitably altered for international realities (e.g., replace "human beings" with
"States" in (1) above). But see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 106-30 (1989) (surveying other definitions
of "positivism" and suggesting that its "deep structure" is not altogether different from what
is sometimes assumed to be its polar opposite, natural law).
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posed by relative normativity.3 The totem he worships is article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and his book is nothing
less than a holy crusade to save the sources of law enshrined in article 38
and consequently, from the author's perspective, the rule of law itself.
Danilenko's avowed aim, to "assess to what extent the transformations in the social and legal infrastructures of the international community
have affected the traditional rules of determining how international law
is to be made or changed,"4 appears modem, but his analysis is decidedly
old fashioned. Danilenko's overall conclusion, that, but for the possible
exception of the concept of jus cogens and other uncertainties which have
emerged, the traditional sources of international law retain their exclusive
validity and explanatory power, was never in doubt. The viability of
article 38 is the starting premise and the forced conclusion of every
question raised.
Danilenko takes up, first, the origin and development of the concept
of formal sources. He then reviews the sources themselves through
chapters on treaties, custom, and general principles of law. In the final
four chapters, the book deals with proposals to reform these sources, jus
cogens, the role of the ICJ, and "some issues of procedure and lawmaking policy." Throughout, Danilenko offers answers in a no-nonsense
style, as sure of the answers (for the most part) as of the places where the
answers are to be found (that is, the evidentiary sources suggested in
article 38 itself). Even though the conclusions are singularly predictable,
stemming from a clear point of departure, students and scholars will find
this book valuable - even if only as a argumentative foil. While Russia
has long provided fertile soil for positivistic approaches to international
law,5 it is still ironic that such a concise defense of what some might

regard as Western "legalism" '6 has been written by a post-Cold War
Russian.
Danilenko acknowledges, both at the beginning of his book and at its
end, that current profound changes in the world, including the
"institutionalization of the World community" call for innovative approaches to lawmaking and that strong pressures exist to modify traditional

3. See, e.g., Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM.
J. INT'L L. 413 (1983). Danilenko may also be responding to the critique of international law
as a "primitive legal system." See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, InternationalLaw as a PrimitiveLegal
System, 19 INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1986); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961)
(describing rules in "primitive communities").
4. G.M. DANILENKO, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY at xiv (1993).
5. See, e.g., G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (William E. Butler trans.,
1974).
6. See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 22 (1964).

Spring 1994]

Positivism Regained, Nihilism Postponed

methods of lawmaking in order to be able to generate new norms rapidly.7
He spends the rest of his book denying this reality, however, demonstrating that notwithstanding attempts by proponents of "radical reform," the
existing sources of law in article 38 still remain the only truly accepted
sources of law. In doing so, Danilenko, like his intellectual forebears
(including Austin, Bentham, Hart, and Kelsen), seeks to maintain the
distinction between law and politics. 8 He fears that the ramparts of law
will crumble, that "international law will become just a loose collection
of vague precepts used as a disguise for conflicting political claims
couched in legal or quasi-legal language."9 Though Danilenko defines his
task as the clarification of the "existing community consensus concerning
the authoritative methods of law-making,"' he finds that consensus
unchanged from what it was in 1945; for him, it is still reflected in the
sources identified in article 38. Neither is Danilenko reticent about
extolling the virtues of his article 38 totem: he contends that it is nothing
less than the Kelsian "constitution" of the modern international community"" that is capable of "transform[ing] a society into a community
governed by law.' 2
Part I of this review briefly surveys the major points of Law-Making
in the InternationalCommunity. Part II critiques Danilenko's traditional
conception of the sources of international law. Finally, Part III concludes
that Law-Making in the InternationalCommunity, though mired in the past
and blind to revolutionary developments within the field, serves as an
important reminder that the doctrine of sources remains an important
mainstay of international law and needs critical attention.
I. POSITIVISM SYNTHESIZED

Danilenko outlines his concept of lawmaking in the first chapter.
Opting for a functionalist explanation for the growth of law, he argues that
the progressive expansion of international law into new fields is the result
of increasing interdependence, technological innovation, and mounting

7. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at xiii, 302.
8. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 2, at 594-600 (including a discussion of Bentham); JOHN
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945); see also DANILENKO, supra note

4, at 17-22.
9. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at xiv.

10. ld
11. Id. at xv, 14-15.
12. Id. at 15, quoting HERMANN

MOSLER, THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COM-

MUNITY 16 (1980); see also KELSEN, supra note 8, at 110-36, 175-77 (indicating that "legal

norms" arise when created by a constitutionally recognized authority).
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needs for cooperation. These needs, he says, require "continuous" lawmaking, including ever more specific rules. 3 While he accepts that economic,
social, and political processes "ultimately determine the content of the
law," Danilenko, true to Hart's definition of a good positivist,'4 quickly
dispatches these "non-legal" phenomena as "too broad for a close legal
analysis of technical aspects of law-making."' 5 His concept of lawmaking
is of a closed logical system, namely the "normative mechanisms and
procedures established within a given legal system for authoritative
creation of legal principles and rules" - that i , the procedures specified
in the traditional concept of formal sources of international law. 16 His
concept of lawmaking is predictably consent-driven and State-centric.
From the outset, Danilenko rejects the view that international lawmaking
constitutes "legislation," as international lawmaking processes are based
on the "consent of sovereign states."' 17 He stresses that his inquiry is
directed at the creation of "general" international law, not its application,
and that the rules he is examining are created by and govern an "international legal community," consisting neither of individuals nor nongovernmental organizations but of States and international organizations. 8
Ever the faithful positivist, Danilenko uses the concept of formal
-sources of law to distinguish the "legal" from the "non-legal."' 9 He
quickly dismisses critics of traditional sources, such as natural lawyers and
adherents of the McDougal-Laswell policy-oriented school, for seeking
to "blur the borderline between law and policy, between legal rules and
other norms of behavior ... " suggesting that such efforts, consciously
or not, are part of a larger phenomenon in which the law is manipulated

13. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 1-5.
14. See supra note 2.
15. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 5. This goes against the grain of at least some modern

legal scholarship whose interdisciplinary objectives are very much contrary to Danilenko's
approach. Compare,for example, the article by Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989) (seeking
to integrate political science approaches with positivist legal theory).
DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 5.
17. Id.at 7.
18. Id.at 12-13. But Danilenko does not suggest that international organizations have
16.

become independent actors or a new "source of law." For him, States remain at the fulcrum of
all sources of law. Even though he recognizes that States have agreed, via treaty, to give certain
international organizations the power to make binding decisions over "internal organizational

matters" and to adopt rules (sometimes by majority vote) in certain "technical" fields, Danilenko
sees these instances as "exceptional arrangements" authorized within the established treaty
source of law and binding only on parties to those treaties, not a new formal source of "general"
law. Id.at 192.
19. Id. at 23, 301. Thus, Danilenko worries that in the "absence of clearly defined

procedures for the creation of peremptory norms,"jus cogens will become a political plaything,
misused to reflect "political preferences." Id. at 214.
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on the grounds of "power politics," as by the former Soviet Union upon
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, or by developing world States trying to
use their numerical majority to alter existing law. 20 Danilenko is equally
hard on those apologists for "soft law" who seek "unprecedented expansion of the concept of law into areas of normative regulation which have
never been considered as belonging to the law proper. ' 21 Citing to
instances in which the World Court has distinguished "political" or
"moral" duties from binding legal obligations, Danilenko stresses the
importance of legal form and a firm distinction between lex lata and lege
ferenda.22 He warns that failure to adhere to these tenets of legal
positivism risks "normative confusion and uncertainty" which would
"erode the concept of legal obligation and weaken the authority of law
within the international community. '"23
Danilenko indicates that he sees no need to explain the ultimate reason
for the authority of the international legal system; he is not seeking
Kelsen's Grundnorm or Hart's ultimate rule of recognition.24 Rather, he
emphasizes that States and other members of the international community
accept the authority of the law and "generally comply with those community rules which have been created in accordance with legitimate
procedures prescribed by constitutional principles. 25 To him, the
legitimacy of international rules depends on the authoritativeness of the
process by which they are created, and he believes that these processes
have now crystallized into the nonstatic, article 38 sources of law. While
he accepts the theoretical possibility that States might add to the existing
sources of law, he argues that the needs for stability and certainty create
a "strong presumption" that article 38 contains a "complete list of sources."

20. Id. at 17-18.
21. Id. at 20. By "soft law," Danilenko apparently means norms which do not proceed from
the recognized article 38 sources of law. Id. at 21. It is not clear whether Danilenko would also
include as "soft" those rules which might emerge from treaty or custom but which are simply
inherently vague in terms of intended obligation. See, e.g., Stephen Zamora, Is There Customary
International Economic Law?, 32 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9 (1989) (noting one example of such
"soft law": the principle that States not "disrupt" the international monetary system).
22. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 22.
23. Id. at 21-22.
24. Id. at 27-29. Nor does Danilenko spend any time with alternative explanations for the
concept of "obligation" in international law - other than the consent of States - whether a
sense of "rightness," natural law, social necessity, sanctions, "systemic" goals, and so on. See,
e.g., Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, in THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN

SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (Steven M. Schwebel ed., 1971). Like the "pragmatically-

inclined" international lawyers, whom Schachter describes, Danilenko does not regard the
ultimate source of obligation as important so long as it can be identified as one of the so-called
formal sources of law in article 38 to which States have consented.
25. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 24 n.26.
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He finds that the absence of any serious attempt to revise article 38 can
"only mean that states parties to the I.C.J. Statute continue to believe that
the 1920 text, as amended in 1945, encompasses all the available sources
of law. 26 He therefore concludes that any new sources of law must today
be created, at least initially, through the accepted processes identified in
article 38.27
Danilenko rejects one alternative "rule of recognition" which has been
suggested for the international system - that international "law" emerges
whenever there is international consensus. He argues that while lawmaking processes are "essentially based on consent," certain of them
dispense with the "actual consent of states" and that in such cases,
recourse to a concept of "right process" is necessary. 28 Danilenko critiques
other proposed new sources of law based on "community-based methods
of law-making," including General Assembly resolutions. 29 He concludes
that there is "no serious evidence ... that the community of States has
abandoned the idea of the 'preordained' formal categories of sources and
accepted consensus, whatever its particular interpretation, as an independent method of law-making., 30 While he accepts that there is a growing
recognition of the concept of jus cogens, he denies that this implies
acceptance of a new nonconsensual source of law based on majority rule.'
Danilenko highlights the "tenuous ground" for the existence ofjus cogens
and warns that "[flack of consensus as regards the basic parameters of the
law-making process for peremptory rules inevitably opens the door to the
political misuse of the concept., 32 He suggests that ifjus cogens is a valid
concept, it developed (or is developing) through the usual customary law
process.33 His overall conclusion is that the existing sources of law in
article 38 remain grounded in a horizontal order of sovereign States and

26. Id. at 40, 202.
27. Id. at 191.
28. Id. at 32.
29. Id. at 199-210. He categorically denies that General Assembly resolutions can make
or unmake law. Id. at 203-10.
30. Id. at 200.
31. See, e.g., id. at 235. On this, Danilenko joins, of course, a long line of positivists who
have emphasized the singular importance of State consent to any proposed rule. See, e.g., Alfred
Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J.INT'L L. 55, 56

(1966).
32. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 214. Compare Anthony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a
Plane, It's Jus Cogens, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990) (sharing Danilenko's skepticism), with
Jordan Paust, The Reality of Jus Cogens, 7 CONN. J.INT'L L. 81 (1991), and the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 702 (1987) (both significantly more supportive of jus
cogens).

33.

DANILENKO, supra

note 4, at 219-38.
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that new community-based sources may become a reality only if States
"abandon the idea of sovereignty . . .34
Danilenko's positivist premises and his belief that the international
legal system needs, above all else, unity, stability, and certainty,3 5 make
many of his particular conclusions predictable. With respect to treaties,
Danilenko concludes that only general multilateral treaties supported by

a large number of States can lead to rules of general application, and, if
so, only through the requisites of custom; 36 that formalities for the entry
into force of a treaty specified in that treaty cannot be dispensed with
through conduct; 37 that treaties do not impose obligations on third parties
without the consent of those third parties - assertions of the creation of
"objective regimes," "global treaties," and article 2(6) of the U.N. Charter
notwithstanding; 38 and that there is no real example of "legislation by
reference," meaning the transmutation of "soft law" into binding obligation
through incorporation in a treaty.39

34. Id. at 304.
35. See, e.g., id. at 202.
36. Id. at 51, 53. Compare id., with Jonathan 1. Charney, InternationalAgreements and
the Development of Customary InternationalLaw, 61 WASH. L. REV. 971, 983 (1986) (taking
a multifactor approach to the same question which would consider the treaty's subject matter,
negotiating history, type of obligation, and nature of rule).
37. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 55-57.
38. Danilenko explains article 2(6) of the U.N. Charter, often read to impose obligations
on non-U.N. members this way:
Article 2(6) is addressed to the United Nations and its members. While members of
the organization may be under a Charter obligation to ensure that all states act in
accordance with the Charter, as a treaty provision this rule still remains res interalios
acta for the third states which are under no legal duty to comply with it. Indeed, the
practice of non-member states shows that they do not consider themselves as legally
bound by the Charter of the United Nations.
Id. at 60. Danilenko also casts doubt on the idea that certain regimes, such as that allegedly
created around the Antarctic Treaty, creates a regime binding on all States since rights and
obligations erga omnes arise only in accordance with articles 34-35 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, i.e., through the creation of customary law. Id. at 62-63. He also rejects
arguments that the deep seabed regime in the Law of the Sea Convention can be imposed on
nonparties to that convention. Id. at 67-68.
39. Danilenko refutes the most cited purported examples, the Law of the Sea Convention
and U.N. Convention on Conditions for Registrations of Ships, largely through reference to the
negotiating histories of these treaties. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 69-74. On the possibility
of incorporation by reference, Danilenko's emphatic conclusion is that
there is no general agreement among states which would allow for the imposition
upon contracting parties of a new broad convention of those rules which had not been
accepted by them prior to the ratification of this convention. It follows that there is
no such thing as legislation by reference or shortcuts towards generally binding rules
through the technique of incorporation.
Id at 74.
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For Danilenko, customary international law usually emerges gradually,
through constant bilateral negotiations between States, requiring both
sufficiently general State practice and acceptance of the practice as law
(opinio juris).40 States consciously create custom, through their reactions
to other States' acts. 4' "Practice," which includes deeds and "other
persuasive manifestations of State legal policy, including official statements," encompasses the practice of international organizations and
international tribunals, but not the actions of individuals as such, since
these are not "subjects" of international law.42 National court decisions
play only an "auxiliary" role in the creation of custom because these
reflect only the views of the States in which they operate, and such courts
are not independent actors in foreign relations. 43 Despite claims to the
contrary, neither General Assembly resolutions nor "other purely verbal
descriptions of preferred norms of conduct" suffice in and of themselves
to constitute State practice." New developments have not seriously eroded
the traditional requirements of practice, i.e., the need for generality,
uniformity, and continuity over a certain period of time.45 Although
modern international negotiations may facilitate the creation of custom
within a "very short period of time," there is "no such thing as 'instant'
custom." 46 While opinio juris need not be limited to verbal acts and may
include "supportive behavior or abstention from protests evincing tacit
consent or acquiescence, 47 it must, however, include an inquiry into
whether the particular State against which the custom is sought to be
applied has acquiesced, since there is no such thing as majority custommaking, and custom does not bind those who persistently object.4 For
much the same reasons, General Assembly resolutions do not express
opinio juris; these are purely precatory under the U.N. Charter.49
A chapter on the interrelations between treaty and custom yields more
tentative conclusions and fewer black letter rules. Danilenko argues that
the individualistic and gradual nature of the custom-generating process,
along with custom's often vague and uncertain scope, leads to a preference
for treaties as the most suitable source for progressive (and more rapid)

40. Id. at 75-76, 79.
41. Id. at 78-82.
42. Id. at 83-84, 87.
43. Id. at 85.
44. Id. at 88-91.

45. Id. at 94-98.
46. Id. at 97 n.74, 98.
47. Id. at 101.
48. Id. at 103-11.
49. Id. at 121-22.
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development.5" He suggests that since custom tends to "reflect the
preferences of the most powerful states," many States favor the more
democratic multilateral treaty source. 51.Nonetheless, because treaties only
bind parties, he contends that the need to establish universally applicable
rules in some areas has helped custom retain its role as a modern form
of rulemaking.52
Danilenko also acknowledges that the codification process has
introduced a new dimension because different negotiating proposals, drafts,
and statements of governments during such a process are increasingly seen
as "important forms of state practice" affecting the development of custom
"parallel to the elaboration of treaty instruments."53 However, he resists
the idea that a customary rule may be developed on the basis of acts
relating to the process of codification such that the drafting of such a
treaty may "crystallize" custom since he finds this merging of the conditions for the creation of treaty and customary rules destablizing.54 For
Danilenko, it would "better serve the stability of international legal
relations" if the focus were kept on the "actual practice of states." '"
Danilenko' s chapter on general principles of law surveys the differing
and contradictory approaches to this third source of law, namely explanations grounded in natural law, or based on a comparative study of
principles of procedure and process operative within individual domestic
legal systems, or looking to principles common to certain representative
legal systems of the world, or choosing principles validated through
international custom. Danilenko even considers the view that "general
principles of law" are not a general source of law at all but are merely
applicable in the judicial context as a kind of "renvoi" to domestic law
permitted ICJ judges.56 Given the obvious uncertainties and (to Danilenko)
the disturbing possibility that this source may license judges to undertake
a "quasi-legislative" role, he repeatedly stresses that general principles are
necessarily few in number, with "rare" judicial invocations." Danilenko
even suggests that despite the wording of article 38, general principles

50.
because
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 130-32. Danilenko also states that custom is also unsatisfactory to legal reformers
it "cannot generate anticipatory, forward-looking legal regimes." Id. at 131.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 143.

54. Id. at 156.
55. Id.
56. Id.at 171-81.
57. Id. at 180-81, 182, 184, 186. He also contends that the World Court has not developed
a coherent concept of this third source of law even where it has applied it. Id. at 183.
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may "retain only the status of a subsidiary source of law. ' 8 As might be
expected, he rejects modern attempts to breathe life into this source of
law, such as suggestions that certain multilateral conventions, not yet
supported by State practice and opinio juris or yet binding qua treaty,
might still obligate States as general principles of law, or suggestions that
General Assembly resolutions be seen in this light. 9
In a separate chapter on the role of the ICJ, Danilenko concludes that
the Court does not adhere to the concept of stare decisis and contends that
the Court's role is limited, as it itself has often indicated, to "law application" and not law creation.6° While he accepts that the Court's pronouncements may affect the rights and interests of nonparties and that it "has
authoritatively confirmed the existence of a number of generally applicable
principles and norms which, although based on the practice of States, were
not sufficiently articulated, 6 ' he contends that "effective law-making
power still remains in the hands of states who may always reject a
particular interpretation of their rights and duties, or, more generally, may
refuse to participate in the work of an institution which seriously
encroaches on their sovereign rights as law-givers."'62 Danilenko thus
confirms what article 38 states: the Court is not itself a source of law.
In a final chapter, Danilenko discusses issues he apparently regards
as subsidiary "policy" or "procedural" questions, not central to the
doctrine of sources, including the potential impact of different types of
negotiating forums (especially as between universal diplomatic forums and
more restricted arenas), the value of consensus as a negotiating technique,
the choice between regulation via comprehensive treaty-making (and their
inevitable "package deals") as compared to more limited arrangements,
as well as the risks adhering to "anticipatory regulation. 63
Danilenko would have readers draw some broad generalizations and
many of these can be briefly stated. Despite some brief allusions to their

58. Id. at 186.
59. Id. at 187-89. Regarding General Assembly resolutions, here, as elsewhere, Danilenko
argues that the international community is not ready to change the
traditional nature of the third source of law ...

by accepting the idea of direct

recognition of new rules through an international instrument of a recommendatory
nature. In fact, such a development is highly unlikely since it would accord the UN
General Assembly, which clearly lacks formal legislative competence, a de facto
legislative power in the guise of one of the formally established sources of international law.

Id. at 189.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

253-60.
256, 258.
261.
266-300.
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activities, international organizations - although involved in the negotiation and promulgation of some 200 multilateral treaties since 19456 are not the heart of international lawmaking, States are.6 Despite its
natural law origins, international law is separable from morality; whether
something is morally desirable has nothing to do with whether something
is or is not a source of binding obligation - Nuremberg and modern
variants such as the ad hoc War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia6 notwithstanding. Although States admittedly do not give their
"actual consent" 67 to many international obligations, lawyers need to rely
on consent ("tacit," "implicit," or whatever) because the sources of law
plainly assume that this is so, and absolute sovereignty would have it no
other way. Although article 38 identifies three sources of law - a
necessary limit intended to promote uniformity, certainty, and stability the third source, general principles of law, is nearly void for vagueness
and contains so few examples that it probably can be ignored or reduced
to mere subsidiary evidence of law, like the writings of scholars. Moreover, of the two real sources left, treaties and custom, treaties are more
important for the development of the law since within them consent is
clearly expressed, and the norms can be precise and instantly effective,
unlike the episodic and gradual customary process. As for the subsidiary
sources of law identified in article 38, even though the actual term used
in article 38, '"judicial decisions," might include national courts, these can
usually be ignored; the real focus should be on the decisions of international tribunals, especially those by the ICJ in contentious cases6 except when these, such as the opinion on the merits in the Nicaragua
Case, misuse or misunderstand the sacred nature of these sources of law. 69
Finally, the reasons for this parsimonious view of international law sources
and the reasons for the strict demarcation between law and politics have,
paradoxically enough, everything to do with realpolitik:States simply will
not accept rules unless they individually have consented to them, and no
rule of general application can really be said to exist unless it has received

64. Id. at 2 n.1.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34.
66. Established by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993).
67. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 32.
68. Such cases are, in Danilenko's view, an "important part of community practice"
especially because "contesting states are under an obligation to comply with them" and
implementation is "ultimately guaranteed by the UN Security Council." Id. at 83 n.29, and
accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Danilenko's critique of the Nicaragua Court's incautious attitude towards the
use of General Assembly resolutions. Id. at 207-08.
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the blessing of those States with the most general of interests, that is,
specially-affected (or powerful) States.
II. THE VIRTUES OF BEING NEGATIVE
Modem international lawyers will find much to criticize in this
doctrinaire book. This is a book which still battles yesterday's jurisprudential battles (such as whether natural law or positive law justifies jus
cogens), still argues over whether judges make or apply law, still believes
that firm distinctions can generally be made between "application" and
"generation" of law, still adheres to a formalistic view of State "practice"
which does not even mention the possibility that paper ratifications to
treaties may not mean actual adherence, and still adopts semantical
definitions of "law" and "legal process" which render irrelevant insights
drawn from international relations or other "non-legal" fields.7' And,
despite the occasional resort to realpolitik,the heirs of legal realism would
scarcely be pleased. Here is a book so long on doctrine and so short on
reality that it purports to address "international law-making" in 1993 with
scarcely a mention of the Security Council and with only a dismissive nod
to international organizations generally.
But Danilenko should not be blamed for weaknesses in the current
state of the teaching of international law. He has merely put - in unusually stark, mechanistic, and rigid terms - material and arguments at the
heart of many an international law survey course, at least as taught in the
United States. Article 38's sources are still, after all, the organizing theme
for many U.S. international law casebooks, and the questions Danilenko
asks and answers are still the ones asked in those books.7' Rather,
Danilenko has done us all a favor. Rather than ignore his book, it should
be appreciated for illustrating the strains in the doctrine of sources.
Danilenko's book aptly demonstrates the need to reformulate international
legal doctrine to modem realities. If instinctive reaction to this book is
negative, this is, nonetheless, negativity from which we can learn.
Danilenko admits that his inquiry may yield only a "partial picture of
the law-making process as it is accepted in the actual practice of the
international community. 72 But "partial" does not begin to capture the
inadequacy of the picture of "law-making" which results when one uses
article 38 as the lens through which to see reality.

70. Most of these issues echo debates dating to the time of Grotius, Pufendorf, and
Bynkershoek. See, e.g., JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 14-18
(1954).
71. See, e.g., BARRY E.CARTER & PHILIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991)
(organized around the article 38 sources of law).
72. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 6.
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Unanswered questions emerge from the outset with Danilenko's
premises. Danilenko's functionalist explanation for the explosion of
international regulatory activity, based on the "increasing economic
interdependence" between sovereign States, seems an inadequate explanation for such diverse phenomena as: the explosion in human rights
promulgation and enforcement; post-Uruguay Round improvements in
GATT dispute settlement; the reactivation of the Security Council; or
the manifold harmonization efforts of UNCITRAL within commercial
law. The assumption that all, or most, of this law-making activity results
solely from the acts of rational, interest-maximizing States remains
empirically unverifiable and has been of course challenged, most prominently by critics of rational-actor models in international relations.73
Similarly challengeable is Danilenko's implied assumption that the
actions of international organizations are merely those of States writ
large - that is, that such organizations are merely the vessels for the
aspirations of States and not significant independent actors in their own
right with their own agendas.74 Danilenko's dismissal of the study of
"economic, social and political processes" in favor of "close, legal analysis"
leaves little room for alternative or supplementary explanations for the
growth of the new international law. Yet it is as likely that "irrational"
revulsion towards certain recent historical events or bureaucratic
developments flowing from the intense commitment of certain "epistemic75
communities" within States or the work of international organizations
- to name but three alternatives - may explain certain legal developments, such as: the establishment of a new U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights; 76 the gradual strengthening of the position of the individual

73. Cf. Susan Strange, Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 337 (Steven D. Krasner ed., 1983). See also Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization and Science Policy, in 47 INT'L ORG. 565 (1993) (arguing that UN-

ESCO's efforts promoted the growth of science policy organizations within States rather than
vice versa).
74. Cf. ERNST B. HAAS, WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS POWER (1990) (examining how international organizations "learn"); Ernst B. Haas, Words can hurt you; or who said what to whom
about regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra note 73, at 23; Stephan D. Krasner,
Regimes and the limits of realism: regimes as autonomous variables, in INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES, supra note 73, at 355; Finnemore, supra note 73.
75. Epistemic communities are defined by social scientists as groups of individuals sharing

a particular expertise and a social agenda. See, e.g., Special Issue, Knowledge, Power, and
International Policy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. (Winter 1992) (issue devoted to studies of
epistemic communities in different international settings).
76. G.A. Res. 141, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 114, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/441
(1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 303.
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within the European Court of Human Rights;' the proclamation of the
Nuremberg Principles; 78 the new War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia; 79 and the United State's recent adherence to the International
Civil and Political Covenant.80
For much the same reasons, Danilenko's state-centric perspective leads
to a grossly incomplete picture of international lawmaking. Danilenko is
too quick to dismiss the role of individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and national courts in international lawmaking. Even if all international legal developments could, at bottom, be explained in terms of the
promotion of States' long-term interests, such generalities may be less
interesting or useful than consideration of the actors more immediately
responsible. These actors are often not States or even international
organizations, but rather nongovernmental organizations and even individuals. 81 Merely to say that a planetary community of individuals is
unrealistic, or that both individuals and nongovernmental institutions lack
formal status at the international level 82 says nothing about these actors'
relevance to international lawmaking. It says nothing about the individual
whose action under the Alien Tort Claims Act8 3 helps to establish the
degree of damage cognizable under international law for violation of the
law of nations; nothing about the growing powers of the SecretaryGeneral, and not only under peacekeeping;84 nothing about the labor or
business representative to the International Labor Organization whose

77. See, e.g., DeWilde, Ooms, and Versyp Cases, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) at 6 (1971)
(permitting counsel to be designated for applicants).
78. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg., at 188, U.N. Doc.
A/64/Add. 1 (1946).
79. See supra note 66.
80. See 138 CONG. REC. S4781-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992).
81. For one example of the myriad insights provided when international texts are studied
as the outcome of bargains between these various groups, see Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler
Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993).
82. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 11-12, 13 n.50. Danilenko's state-centrism, along with
his assumption that national courts make decisions based on internal, not international, rules,
see supra at note 43, have an honored pedigree in the positivist canon: the writings of Jeremy
Bentham. See, e.g., Mark Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of International Law, 78
AM. J. INT'L L. 405 (1984).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948). See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (awarding punitive damages under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
84. Consider, for example, G.A. Res. 129, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., I 4, 6-7, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/129-30 (1993) (authorizing the Secretary General to bring to the Assembly's attention
situations which "might lead" to international friction or dispute), or the Declaration on FactFinding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and
Security, G.A. Res. 59, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/59 (1992) (declaring that
the Secretary General be given a priority role on factfinding).
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initiative leads to a new international labor right. 85 None of these individuals necessarily represent the interests of States and yet all may have
had a greater and more direct role in international lawmaking, the subject
of this book, than the all too abstract "States" which Danilenko repeatedly
invokes. Most notably absent from this book is any examination of the
role of "sovereignty" in modem lawmaking. Yet a book published in
1993, amidst abundant scholarship questioning the very foundations of the
Westphalian system, can hardly afford to be sanguine about the continued
centrality of States to lawmaking.86
Danilenko is also entirely too restrained and constrained by his article
38 totem to realistically assess the ICJ's and other international tribunals'
considerable contribution to the making of general law. Danilenko's all
too brief look at the role of the ICJ ignores that court's own recent
history, 7 along with its role in the interpretation of the U.N. Charter. 8
Having declared that general sources of law must necessarily be an
insignificant, not to say subsidiary source of law, 9 for example, Danilenko
does not examine the very real contribution that the ICJ and other
international tribunals have made regarding that source of law.9° U.S.

85. Cf EDWARD MCWHINNEY, UNITED NATIONS LAW-MAKING 145-61 (1984) (surveying
the impact of the Secretary-General, U.N. lawyers, and the "reformed" International Law
Commission (ILC)).
86. The ever-increasing literature reconsidering the viability of "sovereignty" and its impact
on many different areas of international law includes, JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JAMES FALK,
THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? (1992); David B. Hunter, Toward Global Citizenship in International Environmental Law, 28 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 547 (1992) (discussing the impact of the
"democratization" of the international legal system); Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign
State, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1993). Nor do these insights necessarily stem from post-Cold War
developments. See, e.g., INGRID DETTER DE LupIs, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1987) (describing the "drift away from the exclusive state paradigm" and the relevance of a
variety of nonstate actors); Kabir Ur-Rahman Khan, International Law of Development at
Edinburgh: Methodology, Content and Salient Issues, 1986 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 15,
16-18 (arguing that article 38 sources are no longer the exclusive sources since international
law-creating processes are now "shared" amongst nonstate actors and "quasi-legislative" international organizations); Mary Ellen Turpel & Philippe Sands, Preemptory International Law and
Sovereignty: Some Questions, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 364, 365-66 (1988) (warning that any
analysis ofjus cogens which fails to undertake a "sustained and wholehearted challenge to the
traditional notion of sovereignty" is bound to be disappointing).
87. Cf.MCWHINNEY, supra note 85, at 105-32 (1984) (seeing both "judicial restraint" and
"judicial activism" reflected at different periods).
88. Consider, for example, the teleological rulings in prominent advisory opinions, discussed
in Ervin P. Hexner, Teleological Interpretations of Basic Instruments of Public International
Organizations, in LAW, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 119 (Salo Engel ed., 1964).
89. See supra at notes 56-58.
90. See, e.g., RICHARD B. LILLICH, FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

(1992) (lex evidentia as applied in a variety of international adjudicative and arbitral settings);
DURWARD SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (rev. ed. 1975) (also

discussing lex evidentia as applied in various settings); Keith Highet, Evidence, the Court and
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readers will find Danilenko's description of what the ICJ judges do in
deciding cases reminiscent of Robert Bork's writings on "neutral principles."9 1
Similarly, Danilenko's disparaging view of national courts as nonindependent conduits for the policies of the sovereign executive branch, is
both simplistic and inaccurate. Notwithstanding the doctrines deployed to
ensure that U.S. courts and the Executive speak with "one voice" regarding foreign policy - most especially the act of state doctrine - the fact
remains that U.S. courts do participate in international lawmaking,
sometimes in ways neither pleasing to, nor predicted by, the Executive
branch. U.S. court pronouncements on a variety of subjects - from
human rights to sovereign immunity to the privileges of diplomats - have
contributed to the development of international law in ways that are
scarcely distinguishable from (and perhaps in some instances even more
significant than) the pronouncements of international tribunals. And in
these areas, U.S. courts have not always deferred to the Executive's view
of the substance of the international legal rules under discussion regardless
of the disposition of the case. Certainly from Paquette Habana's view of
the legality of seizure as prize,92 to Sabbatino'sview of international rules
governing expropriation,93 from Rauscher's view of the need for specialty in extradition94 to the Ninth Circuit's rulings on extraterritorial ap-95
plication of U.S. law and on the legality of certain exchange controls,
it cannot be said that U.S. courts have invariably served as the Executive's rubber stamp or that they have served merely to uphold all of the
Executive's claims. 96 Nor is, of course, the role of U.S. national courts

the Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1987) (summarizing evidentiary principles applied
in that case); see also CHRISTOPHER R. Rossi, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A LEGAL
REALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL DECISIONMAKING (1993) (describing the ICJ's and other
international tribunals' development of "equitable principles").
91.

Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.

1 (1971). But while Bork reproved domestic courts and expressed iconoclastic aspirations,
Danilenko is purportedly attempting to provide readers with a description of international
tribunals' actual contribution to lawmaking. His description, however, does not correspond to
reality.

92. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
93. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
94. U.S. v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). See also Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get
Here? Foreign Abduction after Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939, 946 (1993) (noting
the U.S. government's opposition to the rule announced in Rauscher at the time that decision
was rendered).
95. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); West v.
Multibanco Comermex, 807 F.2d 820, 831 (9th Cir. 1987).
96. Decisions such as Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993), and U.S. v.
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992) notwithstanding, U.S. court judgments
which deal with international legal issues, at the Supreme Court and state and lower federal
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unique.' It would be a brave scholar indeed who would suggest that
national court opinions are less significant to the international law-making
process than even a decision rendered by a sole arbitrator or self-serving
pronouncements by a foreign office. 9
Recognition that national courts have a say in international lawmaking
illustrates, more broadly, that Danilenko's traditional elevation of "the

State" as a monolithic entity is not sufficiently nuanced. While Danilenko
is doubtlessly focusing on the State actors involved in traditional lawmaking processes, e.g., the Executive and the legislature insofar as both
become engaged in adhering to a treaty, a more complete and complex
picture of international lawmaking would also consider the impact of

court levels, cannot be reduced to the truism: the Executive always wins. Note that even those
cases which might support Danilenko's position, such as Alvarez-Machain, do not necessarily
produce a judicial opinion which is, on all points, identical with the position of the Executive
branch. Moreover, the point is larger than the number of cases which might be marshalled
either in opposition or in support. The judiciary in the United States, as in many countries, is
constitutionally a separate branch. See, e.g., HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION (1990).
97. See the multitude of cases discussed in BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS (1993); see, e.g., Antonio Cassesse, Remarks
on Scelle's Theory of "Role-Splitting" (dedoublement fonctionnel) in International Law, 1
EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 210, 228-31 (1990) (noting increased role for domestic courts in
international lawmaking, particularly given the number of treaties conferring "quasi-universal"
jurisdiction over international crimes and the increased willingness of domestic courts to act
on "behalf of the international community"); Pieter VerLoren van Themaat, The Impact of the
Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities on the Economic World
Order, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1422, 1425 (1984) (concluding that "the development of public
international case law in its present state mainly results from decentralized judgements by
national courts and only rarely results from compulsory jurisdiction or arbitration").
98. Cf DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 23 n.22 (citing International Arbitral Tribunal: Award
on Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil
Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Jan. 19,1977, 17 I.L.M. 1 (Dupuy,
sole arbitrator)), passim (relying on the formal pronouncements of States). By comparison,
Danilenko's table of case authorities does not cite to a single judgment by a domestic court.
DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 305-09. What is most puzzling about Danilenko's failure to
address domestic judicial opinions is that, even by his own account, at a minimum, these are
probably evidence of State practice. See, e.g., Karl Dohring, The Participation of International
and National Courts in the Law-Creating Process, 17 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1991/92).
Michael Reisman has bemoaned the ironies of the positivists' circumscribed view of "State
practice":
A tribunal established by one party, in the absence of the other, and composed of a
single person, let us say a professor of international law, is treated by other scholars
as an authoritative oracle of international law. At the same time, commentators who
defer to such an award will insist that a contrary General Assembly vote, supported
by virtually every member state, is not indicative of international law but is only a
"recommendation."
W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of
International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 56 (1984).
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different governmental actors within States, including consideration of, for
example, unilateral acts taken by the U.S. Congress intended to have
international effects. Such an analysis might also consider whether certain
of these actors, including legislators, government officials, and diplomats,
resort to different types of international rules, including "soft law," more
so than judges.99
Danilenko's rejection of the possibility of "true" international "legislation," except with respect to the power of certain international organizations to enact, by less than unanimous consent, particular "technical"
regulation, or to adopt "internal" rules, particularly his suggestion that
consent drives international law creation in a way fundamentally different
from the role it plays with respect to domestic law, merits far more
discussion."° Ever since the post-Cold War rejuvenation of the Security
Council, when the votes of a handful of U.N. members have purported
to establish binding decisions on all members and nonmembers alike on
issues central to national sovereignty - including the resort to the use of
force - the idea that international organizations take binding action only
with respect to mundane matters and/or on the basis of the unanimous
consent of members seems strikingly out of date. '0Moreover, the Security
Council is only the most prominent example. What constitutes "technical"
or "internal" regulation is debatable. Are the ICAO Council's condemnatory actions, with respect to the Korean Airlines and Iran Air shootdowns by the then U.S.S.R. and the United States respectively - which
have helped to establish the legality of force in these types of incidents
- merely "technical? ' 2 Do they have no impact on the use of force by

99. Concerning the possibility of who is more likely to resort to "hard" versus "soft" law,
see Zamora, supra note 21, at 41-42 (contending that nonjudicial actors resort to "soft"
international economic norms while that source is relatively unimportant on the judicial level).
100. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 7; see also id. at 192. Danilenko's narrow focus leads
to an exclusion of many acts by international organizations with normative effect. Thus today,
the right of a State to have rights, a consequence of statehood, seems very much tied to the
symbolic validation conferred by membership within an international organization - a point
which, though lost in Danilenko's account of lawmaking, has been very much present in the
actions of entities as diverse as Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Palestine Liberation Organization.
See also Franck's suggestion that an emerging human right to "democracy" may come to be
enforced, in part through the United Nation's symbolic validation. Thomas M. Franck, The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).

101. For one survey of the increasing significance of international organizations to
international lawmaking, see Daniel Vignes, The Impact of InternationalOrganizationson the
Development and Application of Public InternationalLaw, in STRUCTURE AND PROCESS, supra
note 1, at 809. For an argument that these multilateral processes differ fundamentally from
traditional customary lawmaking, see Jonathan Charney, UniversalInternationalLaw, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 529 (1993).
102. International Civil Aviation Organization: Resolution and Report Concerning the
Destruction of Iran Air Airbus on July 3, 1988, adopted Mar. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 896; ICAO
Decision of Sept. 16, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 1149.

Spring 1994)

Positivism Regained, Nihilism Postponed

non-ICAO members? What about recent OAS action with respect to the
restoration of the elected government in Haiti?'13 What about the GATT
panel decision regarding the regulation of fishing for tuna?'0 4 (Or, is this
last example not pertinent because, at least according to Danilenko,
adjudicative processes only "interpret" and do not "make" law?)
In all these instances, Danilenko would answer that to the extent
"general" international law gets made through these acts by international
organizations, it does so through the all-purpose mechanism of custom. 5 If, for example, the Security Council's determinations in Resolutions 7311° and 748,"07 addressing Libya's failure to extradite alleged
terrorists, creates a general rule that either the underlying terrorist act or
the failure to subsequently extradite constitutes an illegal use of force or
aggression, this may become so only gradually, as States, both U.N.
members and nonmembers, protest or accept the alleged rule. This
response, though, presumes that law generated by international organizations must be made to fit the article 38 sources of law. It does not
necessarily reflect how relevant actors today perceive what is going on
- or, more importantly, how they act. But quite apart from perceptions,
when the Security Council purports to take a legally-binding decision
like the one in Resolution 748 (imposing economic sanctions on Libya),
that decision's legal impact is instantaneous.' 8 Further, when the texts
of such decisions purport to bind nonmembers, as many have,"° all

103. See, e.g., Note on OAS Resolution 1080, in UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES
AGAINST CUBA 287-301 (Michael Krinsky & David Golove eds., 1993) (summarizing Organization of American States (OAS) actions on Haiti and interpretative statements by OAS
members).
104. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel, Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594.

105.

DANILENKO,

supra note 4, at 83. In a later chapter Danilenko acknowledges that

multilateral negotiations and consensus approaches - both within international organizations
and outside of them - may have a law-making impact by shaping participants' expectations.

Id. at 266-94.
106. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR,
107. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR,
108. It is striking that Danilenko,
ing the Security Council, the nearest

47th Sess., 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (1992).
47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992).
the faithful positivist, does not spend any time addressthing to an Austinian sovereign that the international

system has yet produced. Cf. AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 1-3, 9-33 (1832) (discussing, among
other things, the powers of the superior to enforce compliance with a wish).
109. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/661
(1990); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/662 (1990)

(proclaiming invalidity of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/670 (1991); S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,

2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991) (imposing various sanctions on Iraq); S.C. Res.
748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3036d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (imposing Libyan sanctions).
Neither are the Council's attempts to bind nonmembers of the United Nations an entirely
post-Cold War phenomenon. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 4741, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., 942d mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/4741 (1961) (taking measures with respect to the Congo).
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relevant actors assume, (pace Danilenko)" ° that nonmembers are legally
bound to comply - presumably at the risk of sanctions for noncompliance. Whatever effect these resolutions have on general rules such as the
use of force, these resolutions have an impact independent from individual
States' acceptance of any underlying rules as custom. The Security
Council's recent actions - such as authorizing force against Iraq constitute that organ's interpretations of its power under the Charter and
no body, including the ICJ, has yet assumed the power to question the
Council. At a minimum, a State acting in conformity with a Security
Council decision, as with respect to sanctions against the former Yugoslavia or with respect to Libya, appears to have a strong prima facie case
against any challenge to the legality of its action.'
Because Danilenko omits analysis of the role of the Security Council,
he also fails to address issues raised by those who criticize the Security
Council's all too easily exercised "powers of appreciation.""" 2 Along with
its authorization to use force with respect to the Gulf War, the Council,
after all, also purported to: delegitimize an occupying power, 1 3 make
authoritative findings with respect to violations of diplomatic immunity
or human rights," 4 interpret humanitarian law," 5 make various determinations of State responsibility for damages," 6 establish a reparations

110. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 60. Recent Security Council activity also casts doubt
on Danilenko's broad assertion that "in the contemporary international community no group
of states is in a position to impose particular principles and norms on other groups within the
framework of either treaty or customary law-making." Id. at 111.
Cf. Case Concerning
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, 1992 I.C.J. 114 (Interim Measures Order of April 14)
[hereinafter Lockerbie Case](finding S.C. Res. 748 binding on Libya). The danger that the
permanent members of the Council are in a position to do just that is precisely the fear that
has driven at least some U.N. members to propose reforms to Council membership to
ameliorate the risks. See generally Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in

the Membership of the Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 48th
Sess., Agenda Item 33, U.N. Doc. A/48/264 (1993) (reporting U.N. members reform
proposals) [hereinafter Report of Secretary-General].

111. See Lockerbie Case, 1992 I.C.J. 114. See also Case Concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. 325 (Sept. 13) (Order on
Provisional Measures, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 888 [hereinafter Bosnia Case].
112. See, e.g., Burns Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision
Making: PrecariousLegitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991); Thomas M. Franck, The Powers
of Appreciation: Who is the Ultimate Guardianof UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1992).

113. S.C. Res. 662, supra note 109.
114. S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (1990);
S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (1990); S.C. Res.
688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
115. S.C. Res. 670, supra note 109.
116. Id.; S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686
(1991); S.C. Res. 687, supra note 109, at 7; S.C. Res. 705, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/705 (1991).
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tribunal," 7 interpret and enforce the provisions of a bilateral boundary
treaty,"18 require the acceptance of fact-finders with respect to boundary
demarcation," 9 and weapons inspection, 120 compel the renouncement of
terrorism,' 2' and determine legal title to property. 22 Since the Charter
requires members to accept and carry out decisions of the Security
Council, presumably Danilenko would regard State obligations pursuant
to these Resolutions as binding treaty obligations derived from members'
initial consent to the Charter. Obviously, this does not address many
thorny issues about normative effect, including questions about judicial
review'2 3 or, more broadly, questions relating to the legitimacy of such
quasi-judicial determinations by a preeminently political body (or
delegated subentities). 2 That Danilenko's analysis provides little ammunition for those who would find some Security Council decisions ultra vires,
as against members, should not be altogether surprising. The good
positivist would applaud the words of Captain Vere, the commanding
officer of the court martial in Billy Budd: "[H]owever pitilessly
... law
' 25
may operate, we nevertheless adhere to it and administer it.'

117. S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2987th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (1991).
118. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 109.
119. Id.;
S.C. Res. 689, U.N. S.C.O.R., 2983d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/689 (1991).
120. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 109, at 4-6, 8-9; S.C. Res. 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
3004th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/707 (1991).
121. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 109, at 9.
122. S.C. Res. 712, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2983d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RESI712 (1991).
123. See Lockerbie Case, 1992 I.C.J. 114; Bosnia Case, 1993 I.C.J. 325. The dilemma for
positivists posed by Security Council decisions is not an easy one. On the one hand, the concept
of an unreviewable Council decision appears tantamount to making the Council the progenitor
of a preemptory norm merely on the basis of nine votes. On the other hand, permitting the ICJ
to review a Council decision would seem to require a reading of the Charter not wholly
consistent with its plain text.
124. See W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM.
J. INT'L L. 83 (1993). Danilenko's concept of lawmaking certainly does not begin to address
how much of international law is now being made by delegation, as through the decisions of
the bodies created by the Council and operating without the veto, such as the U.N. Compensation Commission (for Iraq), the various U.N. Sanctions Committees, and, if it becomes
operational, the new War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. See John R. Crook, The
United Nations Compensation Commission - A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility,
87 AM. J.INT'L L. 144 (1993); Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development
of InternationalLaw, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78 (1994); Michael P. Scharf & Joshua L. Dorosin,
Interpreting UN Sanctions: The Rulings and Role of the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, 19
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 771 (1993) (including a systematic analysis of over 100 key rulings of that
committee). Nor does it address how the day-to-day apparently binding decisions made by these
entities really differs from what he would regard as "non-consensual" domestic legislation.
125. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD 244-46 (F.B. Freeman ed., 1948), quoted in W.
MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE 269 (1987). Also see the famous
exchange between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller: H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958), and Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law
- A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
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Danilenko's reliance on "consent" as the driving force behind international lawmaking also prompts more questions than answers. Danilenko
relies on State consent throughout his book - in order, among other
things, to argue against alternative sources of law not identified in article
38, to disparage the law-making quality of General Assembly resolutions,
and to cast doubt on aspects of jus cogens - as if the notion of consent
is both noncontroversial and self-explanatory. As the manifold critics of
the concept of consent have shown, however, it is neither. Danilenko does
not address the many objections to consent-based theories raised by such
scholars as Martti Koskenniemi (although he cites Koskenniemi's major
work, From Apology to Utopia).12 6 Readers do not get an explanation as
to why State consent, tacit or express, is a principle worth respecting or
why that principle itself is immutable. The difficulties of ascertaining
consent are scarcely addressed, nor
are philosophical dilemmas of the type
127
raised by critical legal scholars.
Danilenko's strained attempts to fit the traditional sources of law into
a "consent" framework are particularly evident with respect to general
principles of law. Having shown the wide diversity of possible candidates
for this source of law, it is strikingly inadequate to suggest, as Danilenko
does, that the simple word "recognized" in the article 38 definition of
"general principles" sufficiently demonstrates that source's grounding in
the consent of States. 128 Danilenko's rigid adherence to consent also leads
him to some controversial conclusions: readers of this book will find that
"preemptory norms" are not preemptory at all, at least not to France and
other States who have objected to the concept, 129 and further, that countries
displeased by Security Council measures, such as Iraq or Libya, are in
principle free to disregard such binding decisions, provided they cease
being members of the United Nations.130 Danilenko's rigid consensualism
also leads him to demur on one principle on which most
(Western)
13 1
lawyers agree: new States are bound to existing custom.

126. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 324 (citing KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2).
127. Cf. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2, at 270-83. For Koskenniemi, the consent principle
is either a "fully apologist" doctrine incapable of securing a truly objective binding law or a
"utopian" concept ultimately derivable from some nonconsensual source of obligation, such as
natural law.
128. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 176. Compare Mark Janus' inclusion of general
principles, along with natural law and jus cogens, as "nonconsensual sources of law." MARK
JANUS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-66 (1993).

129. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 234-38.
130. Id. at 60-61; supra note 38.
131. Id. at 116. For a summary of the views of scholars on the issue, see KOSKENNIEMI,
supra note 2, at 272-73. Danilenko presumably sidesteps the issue because it poses an awkward

choice between his two most treasured premises: the need for State consent and the need for
unity, stability, and certainty.
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Moreover, for all its reliance on the principle of consent, surprisingly
little is actually said in this book about what "consent" means. If international "legislation" does not exist because it is not based on consent as
Danilenko suggests, 132 how is a State's consent to be ruled by an international organization conceptually different from, for example, the "consent
of the governed," the basis for congressional power given in the U.S.
Constitution? Moreover, is the original "consent" of the State when it
adhered to the treaty or the original understanding of the "international
community" at the time the treaty was concluded, the same or analytically
distinct from original "intent"? What relative weight should be accorded
to evidence of original intent/consent, treaty text, or institutional practice
when, for example, it is alleged that an international organization is acting
in derogation of jus cogens? To these questions, Danilenko's general
lodestars - certainty, stability, and predictability - do not yield clear
answers. 133 Despite repeated reliance on the negotiating histories of many

132. See supra note 17. But note that Danilenko is far from alone in dismissing the notion
of international "legislation." See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, The Cult of Custom in the Late
20th Century, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 133, 136, 144-45 (1987) (arguing that in the absence of
an international legislature, what is produced is "semantic law," the "caricature of legislation;"
Reisman also condemns "voodoo" jurisprudential approaches unconnected to the realities of
power politics).
133. More specifically, why should the United States' consent, given in 1945 to the U.N.
Charter, or the interpretation attached to that consent at the time by all the relevant actors, bind
the United States or anyone else in 1994, in a vastly different world with a vastly different
organization? For example, the Clinton Administration was faced in 1994 with the prospect of
continuing to abide by an arms embargo on Bosnia, pursuant to a binding Security Council
decision, or acting in breach of that decision in order to permit Bosnia to have the wherewithal
to exercise its "inherent" right of self-defense. The "consent" of the United States given in 1945
might arguably be said to be as irrelevant (or relevant) to that decision as any "consent" given
by the constitutional framers in 1789 for purposes of a decision as to the constitutionality of
a domestic law enacted last year. If differences exist between the U.N. Charter and U.S.
Constitution for these purposes, as they undoubtedly do, the difference might be better captured
by focusing on the different type of legal communities (or "interpretative communities") created
since 1945 within the United Nations, and since 1789 within the United States. See Ian Johnston,
Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretative Communities, 12 MIcH. J.INT'L L. 371

(1991). In other words, if it is true that today the Security Council is not as free to enact
"generally applicable" law as is the U.S. Congress on the domestic plane, this may be due to
the fact that the latter's power has expanded (or contracted) through community consensus on
such issues as, for example, the scope of the Commerce Clause and the Bill of Rights. That the
U.S. Congress always had, according to the text of the U.S. Constitution, a plenary legislative
capacity which the Security Council plainly lacks (based on the text of the U.N. Charter), is
only one part of the equation, particularly given the decidedly elastic terms of both the Security
Council's chapter VI and VII powers and much of the U.S. Constitution. If, on the other hand,
U.N. institutional developments have proceeded (as perhaps they now have) to the point that
the Security Council has a wide license to interpret the vague terms of article 39 and 33 broadly,
then maybe the fact that the Charter framers in 1945 would never have acquiesced in a
resolution such as Resolution 748, S.C. Res. 748, supra note 109, (Libyan economic sanctions)
or resolution 827, supra note 66 (establishment of an ad hoc War Crimes Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia), is unimportant either to the legitimacy or the effectiveness of any such
Council act. The point is that original intent or consent arguments are, at least in principle, no
more or no less theoretically possible for purposes of the interpretation of the U.N. Charter as
they are for purposes of the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
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of the multilateral treaties cited, Danilenko gives no reasons in this book
to privilege original intent arguments, particularly in the case of treaties
34
creating an institution like the United Nations.
As to the evidentiary sources demonstrative of "consent," although it
appears, at least initially, that Danilenko is attempting through his book
to prove that States continue to rely on article 38 sources, it becomes clear
quite early that Danilenko is using article 38 itself to determine what types
of manifestations of State behavior are legally relevant. For Danilenko,
State "consent" (at least for lawyers) is presumptively evinced by only
certain types of evidence of State action - such as memorials filed before
the ICJ, formal diplomatic pronouncements made in connection with
adherence to a treaty, or the views of prominent scholars. Apparently, the
only evidence of legally relevant "consent" worth paying attention to are
those expressly mentioned in article 38(d) or directly derivable from its
listing of sources. Even assuming that Danilenko is right to focus on the
behavior of States as such, his rigid adherence to article 38 leads him to
ignore other evidence of State behavior, such as would be contained in
35
press accounts.
His fidelity to article 38 also leads Danilenko to ignore evidence of
"consent" by nonstate actors. Even the institutional practice of international organizations, hardly a novel form of evidence of law, gets filtered
through a State-centric lens, despite the risk of oversimplification or
misrepresentation. Thus, readers are informed that the ICJ's Advisory
Opinion in the Namibia Case stands for the general proposition that a
minority of States can modify any multilateral treaty "if there is general
acceptance by other parties."' 136 While Danilenko might be correct that

134. Cf.Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 184-97 (July 20)

(separate opinion of Judge Spender) (giving various reasons why reliance on the original intent
of the drafters of the Charter is "beset with evident difficulties") [hereinafter Expenses Case].

135. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 98, at 1, 4 (1984) (stressing the need for reliance on
nonformal sources more "congruent with expectations of authority and control held by effective

elites"). It is, for example, hardly convincing to point to the high number of ratifications to the
Convention on Discrimination against Women without considering, not only the formal

reservations filed with respect to that Convention, but also the level of implementation by
signatories. The lack of such empirical curiosity is yet another reason why Law-Making in the
InternationalCommunity describes only partially (if at all) existing reality. But see Anthony
D'Amato, A Seminar on Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 73 (Anthony D'Amato
ed., 1994) (criticizing international lawyers' tendency to be "loose and muddled in our sources
of law" and praising domestic lawyers for their rigor in confining themselves to "statutes and
cases") [hereinafter ANTHOLOGY].
136. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 167-71. In that case the Court affirmed the validity of
a Security Council decision adopted with the abstentions of two permanent members, despite
article 27(3) of the Charter requiring "an affirmative vote of nine members including the
concurring votes of the permanent members." Legal Consequences of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 22 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Case].
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such a general rule of treaty interpretation exists, the Namibia opinion
might more accurately be seen in light of established institutional law as support for the proposition that, at least within the United Nations, each
organ is presumptively entitled to determine the legality of its acts and is
also entitled to a presumption of legality.'37 That case is also an example
of the relevance of institutional practice to the interpretation of an
organization's constitutive instrument, an issue of no small import in terms
of prior ICJ cases. 38 The case hardly stands for the proposition that any
modification by a minority of treaty parties outside the institutional
context of the United Nations is acceptable. Moreover, as at least one of
the concurring opinions in that case suggested, even within the U.N.
context, absent Charter amendment, subsequent de facto modifications
might be possible only when the language of the Charter so permits; that
39
is, when the Charter language is vague enough to permit the change.
Similarly, Danilenko's suggestion that since only States may bring a
contentious case before the ICJ and since article 38 refers only to conventions between "States," other agreements, such as those between international organizations, do not enjoy "judicial" recognition" is at best
misleading. Such agreements have been the subject of judicial attention
1 42 - and, pursuant to existing
- within domestic courts' 4' and in the ICJ
of a binding decision in the ICJ or
treaties, may even be the subject
43
international arbitral tribunals.
137. See, e.g., Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. 161.
138. For varying views on the value of institutional practice to Charter interpretation,
consider the views of Sir Percy Spender's, separate opinion in id at 184-97; Competence of
the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 15-19,

23-24 (Mar. 3) (dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez); South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.;
Liber. v. S. Afr.) 1966 I.C.J. 6, 352-53 (July 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Jessup).
139. See, e.g., Namibia Case, 1971 I.C.J. at 153-54 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
Thus, most commentators would probably assume that no amount of institutional practice could
permit the Security Council to adopt a purportedly binding decision over the veto of a permanent

member in defiance of article 27.
140. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 45.
141. See, e.g., U.S. v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
142. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Apr. 26).

143. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations and Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, arts. 53, 64, 66, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 129/11-12 (1986); Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United

Nations, Feb. 13, 1846, art. 30,21 U.S.T. 1418. See also Agreement Between the United Nations
and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26,
1947, art. 21, 11 U.N.T.S. 11 (providing for international arbitration). Danilenko also states that

neither the earlier Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties nor the 1986 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations and between International
Organizations, contain rules providing for the modification of treaties by subsequent practice.
DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 166. While this is true for the first convention, the second
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Many established principles of international law are difficult to explain
in terms of either the formal sources identified in article 38 or the lawmaking processes (and evidence) discussed in this book. Danilenko notes,
in passing, for example, that the "international legal personality of
international organizations was recognized by the I.C.J. in 1949."'44 The
1949 Reparations Case did far more than "recognize" that principle. It
essentially created that rule out of whole cloth and gave it specific content.
In that case, the General Assembly asked the Court whether the United
Nations could bring a claim, both against a member of the organization
and against a nonmember, and receive money damages for the harm
incurred both by the organization and its agents. It was the Court, not the
General Assembly, which decided that the answers to these separate
questions turned on the organization's possession of "international
personality.' 45 Yet as the Court itself indicated, 46 the text of the Charter,
though reasonably clear on the legal capacity of the organization within
the territory of each of the member States, says nothing about international
personality. 47 Nor was the issue clearly resolved during negotiations on
the Charter, and the Court's majority does not even mention the negotiating
record.148 Instead, the majority turned to the "requirements of international
life," as informed by the practice of the organization (including its entry
into treaty relations), for its conclusion that the organization possesses "a
large measure of international personality."' 149 Further, in giving an
affirmative answer to the question regarding capacity to bring a claim for
an agent's own damages, the Court candidly admitted that it faced a "new
situation" which it answered by "implying" a "necessary" power because,
as the General Assembly had recognized, the organization "needed" to

acknowledges in article 2(1)(j) (definition of "rules of the organization") the relevance of
institutional practice. By implication, the 10 Convention may therefore affirm the approach taken
by the Court in the Namibia Case.
144. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 12 n.49.

145. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 178
(Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparation Case].
146. Id.
147. U.N. Charter arts. 104, 105, (1).
148. A Belgian proposal, which would have recognized "that the Organization ...possesses
international status..." was rejected, in part because it was unclear to what extent such status
was to be the same or distinct from the status of sovereign States. At least one delegate suggested
that the issue, or at least its particular implications, should be resolved later by the General
Assembly. See Louis SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 32-33 (2d ed. 1967) (citing
materials from the Committee IV/2, May 32, 1945). As often happens, the delegates evidently
decided to agree to disagree on the issue, with the drafting committee concluding that the Belgian
proposal was "superfluous" since "it will be determined implicitly from the provisions of the
Charter taken as a whole." Id.
149. Reparation Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 178-79.
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protect its agents.' 50 Finally, even though the Court had earlier argued that
international personality cannot be equated with the right to bring a claim,
when faced with the need to resolve the question of whether the United
Nations could bring claims against nonmembers, the Court retreated to the
proposition that "fifty states, representing the vast majority of the members
of the international community, had the power, in conformity with
international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective
international personality, and not merely personality recognized by them
alone, together with capacity to bring international claims.'' Just why
this is so, the Court did not explain, nor did it explain how, other than by
"good will and common sense," these newly-authorized U.N. claims on
behalf of its agents' damages were to be reconciled
with traditional
52
espousal claims by the agents' home States.
Despite the logical flaws in the opinion and despite the accusation
from dissenting Judges Hackworth and Krylov that the majority was, on
many issues, legislating from the bench,'53 the majority's view in the
Reparations Case produced nearly instantaneous results. At the next
session of the General Assembly, the Secretary General requested and
received General Assembly approval of a resolution affirming that the
Court's opinion was an "authoritative expression of international law on
the questions considered" and accepting the Secretary General's detailed
procedure for the presentation of U.N. claims (which incidentally gave the
Secretary Generfil substantial discretion
in the determination, negotiation,
4
and acceptance of such claims).
Thus, the proposition that the United Nations, as well as other
comparable institutions, is a "person" with the general capacity to engage
in at least some acts, like other international persons, such as the bringing
of claims and treaty-making, achieved nearly instant status as international
law. This is at least partly the result of processes which Danilenko either
fails to discuss or affirmatively disparages, namely, a nonbinding but

150. Id. at 182-83.
151. Id. at 185, quoted in DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 62 n.81. Danilenko does not tell

readers how the 50 original U.N. members were able to "impose" this international personality
on others, nor how the establishment in 1949 of this principle was consistent with his view that
the U.N. Charter does not impose obligations on nonmembers. Id. at 208-09.

152. Reparation Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 185-86.
153. Id. at 198, 219 (dissenting opinions of Judges Krylov and Hackworth).
154. G.A. Res. 365 (IV), U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/365 (1949). In doing
so, the General Assembly's action produced other incidental legal effects. It obviously expanded
the legal authority of the Secretary General vis-,-vis members and nonmembers and helped to

establish principles which would subsequently be cited in the context of principles of State
responsibility (such as the inappropriateness of "exemplary" or punitive damages). See SOHN,
supra note 148, at 47-54.
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teleological judicial opinion which relies on such nontraditional sources
of law as the "principle of effectiveness," coupled with other institutional
processes (including a General Assembly resolution and the initiative of
an individual, the Secretary General). Such is the way one set of international rules came to fruition in 1949 and such is the way many of them
emerge today - not packaged in the neat article 38 boxes Danilenko
describes, but through community processes, most especially involving the
General Assembly.

155

That old arguments about the status of General Assembly resolutions
need to be rehashed at this late date is a testament to the remarkable
staying power of positivist dogma in the face of reality. Can anyone
today afford to ignore the General Assembly's role in norm creation,
especially in the areas of human rights and outer space?15 6 Where is the
widespread evidence of State practice and community consensus, quite
apart from General Assembly's actions, with respect to the prohibition
on national appropriation of the moon, the principle of free exploration
of space, or the use of nuclear weapons in space?' 57 If not through a
process like "instant customary law" created via General Assembly
action, how exactly did these and other rules of international law, like
the Nuremberg Principles, achieve legal status?'58 Are courts such as

155. Compare Ronald Dworkin's famous discussion of the interplay between guiding
"principles," judicial discretion, and final judge-made rule, in particular his argument that the
judicial resolutions of hard cases are difficult to explain based on positivist premises. See Ronald
Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, quoted in W. MICHAEL
REISMAN, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW (1987)

294-305. But see

KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2, at 20-51 (illustrating contradictions inherent to approaches based
on "relative indeterminacy").
156. For an exhaustive survey of the various types of Assembly resolutions and their
different types of legal effect, which concludes with a three-fold typology (distinguishing
Assembly decisions, recommendations, and declarations), see Blaine Sloan, GeneralAssembly
Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later), 58 BROOK. Y.B. INT'L L. 39 (1987).
157. Cf. Christopher Joyner, U.N. GeneralAssembly Resolutions and InternationalLaw:
Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 445,
468-69 (1981). As Louis Henkin has noted, the burden seems to be on those who would
insist, as presumably would Danilenko, that a regime for outer space did not exist prior to its
formalization by multilateral treaty. Louis Henkin, International Organizationsand the Rule
of Law, 22 INT'L ORG. 656, 660 (1969).
158. Compare Riggs' strained attempts to explain the Assembly's nonlaw-making role
with respect to the Nuremberg Principles in Robert Riggs, The United Nations and the
Development of InternationalLaw, 2 B.Y.U. L. REv. 411, 431-32 (1985). For the arguably
"instant" effects on custom brought on through the work of the International Law Commission or other multilateral negotiations, see, e.g., Charles De Visscher, Stages in the
Codification of International Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 17
(Wolfgang Friedmann et al. eds., 1972); R. Y. Jennings, Recent Developments in the International Law Commission: Its Relations to the Sources of InternationalLaw, 13 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 385 (1964); Ian Sinclair, The Impact of the Unratified Codification Convention, in
REALISM IN LAW-MAKING (Adriaan Bos & Hugo Siblesz eds., 1986).
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Filartigav. Pena-Irala59 as wrong as the World Court in the Nicaragua
Case when they resort to General Assembly resolutions to determine the
normative content of international human rights?"6 To the extent international law is determined by what States and their component parts do
and say, as Danilenko repeatedly avers, it seems odd to say that when they
rely on General Assembly resolutions to establish the scope of their or
others' legal rights and duties, that they are "wrong." Moreover,
Danilenko's attempt to distinguish General Assembly resolutions with
binding "internal" effect - presumably including legally-binding decisions
under article 22 (creation of subsidiary bodies) and article 17 (approval
of the budget) - from resolutions with only purportedly general or
"external" effects, does not gain credence from the fact that this distinction
has been made by others. 6 ' Given the tangled web which the Charter now
weaves between treaty and custom, 162 "internal" interpretations of the
Charter by responsible organs often generate "general" international law,
even if "only" to determine, for example, that a discussion about a State's
human rights policies towards its own people does not constitute unlawful
interference in a State's internal affairs.163 And, the consequences of
General Assembly action outside the scope of its recommendatory powers
may not be limited to U.N. members. The contribution that the U.N.
Administrative Tribunal has made to international law is not any less
because the Tribunal was created by the Assembly under article 22; nor

159. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).

160. There is a vast literature on the impact of human rights norms - both "hard" and
"soft" - within domestic courts. See, e.g., John Claydon, The Application of International
Human Rights Law by CanadianCourts, 30 BUFF. L. REV. 727 (1981); Richard B. Lillich, The
Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting InternationalHuman Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 153 (1978).
161. See, e.g., Jochen A. Frowein, The Internal and External Effects of Resolutions by
InternationalOrganizations,49 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES REICHT UND
V6LKERRECHT (ZAoRV) 778-87 (1989); Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effects of Resolutions of
the UN General Assembly on Customary International Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 73RD
ANNUAL MEETING OF ASIL, 197, at 301-03.
162. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 93-97
(June 27) (particularly at 1H 174-82).
163. Even as early as 1962, Louis Henkin recognized that

[i]nternational organizations also make law in less formal ways. In the UN every
organ interprets the Charter to determine its own prerogatives and sometimes those

of other organs. The General Assembly, in particular, has repeatedly overridden
claims that it was exceeding its Charter authority: It has successfully claimed the
power to discuss and make recommendations on issues of war and peace (Korea),
on self-determination (French Algeria), on human rights (South Africa); it has

purported to make binding assessments for contributions to various UN programs,
e.g., the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).
Henkin, supra note 157, at 660.
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is the General Assembly's potential power to tax under article 17 and its
consequent possible effects on basic principles, such as the scope of
peacekeeping, necessarily of interest only to members of the organization. 16 Similarly, nonmembers can scarcely afford to ignore, certainly not
after the ICJ's Advisory Opinion in the Namibia Case, the legal effects
of the Assembly's termination of South Africa's mandate over that
territory. 65 While Danilenko's citations to many of those who hold
contrary views with respect to General Assembly resolutions suggest that
he is aware of these developments, his refusal to wade beyond the water's
edge of article 10 of the Charter is a grave flaw in a work which repeatedly denigrates the role of the Assembly in lawmaking.' 66
Quite apart from the work of international governmental organizations
as such, there are many other examples of international lawmaking not
captured by Danilenko's analysis. Persons interested in the issue of
whether international legal rules exist which govern corporate conduct,
including, for example, the specific question of whether legal rules exist
to govern the marketing of breast-milk substitutes, must consider the
World Health Organization's (WHO) Code on the subject. 67 Today, the
vast majority of States adhere to rules on this subject, 68 yet the formal
legal status of the Code from the perspective of article 38 sources is
dubious at best. The Code is not a treaty, nor was it adopted pursuant to

164. See, e.g., Expenses Case, 1962 I.C.J. 151.
165. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21)
(finding that Assembly had implicit power to terminate South Africa's mandate and implicitly
finding this termination effective even as against nonmembers of the United Nations). Indeed,
even powers as supposedly "internal" as the power to suspend or expel members (articles 4 and
5), may have substantial "external" legal effects. Will, for example, the Assembly's and the
Council's actions with respect to the voting rights of the former Yugoslavia constitute precedents
for future human rights violators? See, e.g., S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3116th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992); Recommendation of the Security Council of 19 September 1992,
U.N GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. A/471L.1 (1992). At a minimum, the
Assembly's articulation of a proposed rule presents an advocate of that rule with the argument
that the international community has been thereby put on notice that such a rule has emerged
or is emerging and permits adverse inferences if a State fails to object.
166. Cf. Gidon Gottlieb, Global Bargaining: The Legal and Diplomatic Framework, in
LAW-MAKING INTHE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 109, 120-21, 122-23 (Nicholas G. Onuf ed., 1982)
(discussing Assembly and other international organizations' resolutions as "self-enabling, selflicensing, or self-authorizing" informal agreements between States); Joyner, supra note 157
(seeing Assembly resolutions as, among other things, a "many-tiered communications process
among governments"); Richard Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General
Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 783 (1966) (noting that resolutions' "formal validity" is not
very significantly connected with their "functional operation" as law).

167. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF THE MARKETING OF
BREAST-MILK SUBSTITUTES (1981).
168. See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, Codes of Conductfor TransnationalCorporations:The
Case of the WHO/UNICEF Code, 40 INT'L ORG. 815 (1986).
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an international organization's charter permitting binding rulemaking; the
Code itself was merely incorporated as part of a defacto contract between
certain nongovernmental organizations and the leading corporate seller of
the product, Nestle. It is, in short, that example of nonlaw most disparaged
in this book: "soft law." If the Code (or the rules contained therein) has
any legal status at all under the traditional article 38 sources, it must be
as customary law or perhaps, since the Code has been incorporated by
many States as domestic law, as general principles of law.
Yet any "evidence" of "State" consent, such as it is, must be sought
in the types of sources which Danilenko does his utmost to disparage domestic laws, regulations, or national court decisions which incorporate
in substance or by reference the provisions of the WHO Code. Moreover,
a focus solely on the actions of States says little about how the WHO
Code was promulgated and made effective - certainly essential elements
of "law-making" under anyone's analysis. As Kathryn Sikkink has made
quite clear, the Code's promulgation and effectiveness stems more from
the actions of certain epistemic communities both within international
organizations and within nongovernmental organizations than from States
themselves 169 - a phenomenon singularly ill-suited to Danilenko's statecentric, article 38 perspective on lawmaking. One would conclude, on the
basis of a positivistic analysis, that the WHO Code - as well as an ever
proliferating body of norms such as those considered under the rubric
"international sports law"' 170 and many within international economic and
environmental law 171 - are not rules of international law. Such a conclusion is faithful to article 38 at the expense of being seriously misleading. Indeed, a corporate client given this positivistic answer might be

169. Id. This is not a phenomenon unique to the WHO Code. Industry, for example, has
sometimes assumed the role of "first mover" on environmental issues, thereby helping to
promote the hardening of "soft law." See, e.g., Craig N. Murphy, The United Nations' Capacity
to Promote SustainableDevelopment: The Lessons of a Year that "Eludes All FacileJudgment",
in ALBERT LEGAULT ET. AL, THE STATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 1992, ACUNS REPORTS

AND PAPERS No.3, at 49, 61 (1992).
170. See, e.g., JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW (1988). Doubtless,
Danilenko would consider this an example of an attempt to illegitimately expand "the concept
of law" into "areas of normative regulation which have never been considered as belonging to
the law proper." DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 20. Danilenko does not explain, however, what
"properly" belongs to the domain of law.
171.

See, e.g., KENNETH DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1982); Norbert Horn, Codes of Conduct for MNEs
and TransnationalLex Mercatoria:An InternationalProcess of Learning and Law Making, in
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (Norbert Horn ed.,

1980) [hereinafter LEGAL PROBLEMS]; Hans Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conductfor
MultinationalEnterprises,in LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra, at 3-38. For a summary of international
environmental "soft" law, see PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 26-30 (1992).
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entitled to damages for malpractice - and not merely if the client was
intending to do business in a State which had explicitly adopted the WHO
Code as domestic law. "Law" of this type, however "soft," might yet have
a "bite" - and certainly a bite no different than many "harder" forms of
international law. 172 Moreover, Danilenko does not address the further
possibility of "law" arising - whether "hard" or "soft" - without any
clear "bite" at all, that is, simply through a "reward" scheme 73totally
lacking in Austinian sanctions or the possibility of adjudication.'
Danilenko's book is designed to convince that no such continuum of
binding force exists or ought to exist; that "soft" and "hard" rules exist
in separate compartments. But the permeability of the black letter rules
Danilenko describes undermine his efforts to secure determinacy. Though
he states that custom cannot be instant, he is forced to admit that it has
arisen "within a very short period of time" in some cases. 7 4 Though he
extols the importance of the practice of specifically-affected States in
helping to distinguish "real" rules of custom, he argues that not all
specially-affected States are equal: since there are some "areas of law
calling for general solutions," the position of the equatorial countries on
the geostationary orbit of international power probably cannot generate

172. Danilenko, like most international positivists, ignores the difficulty of differentiating
between "hard" and "soft" norms at the level of enforcement. Since most international norms
are not subject to binding dispute settlement or other forms of enforcement analogous to those
available under domestic law, such distinctions may be artificial and difficult to .make. Indeed,
both "soft" and "hard" law might be subject to the same mechanism for enforcement - such
as a requirement that the parties exchange certain information. For an example, see the
procedures established under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
Document of the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect for Human
Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule of Law, and Procedures for Fact-Finding, Oct. 3, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 1670, compared to the information exchange provided for in the ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, CODE OF LIBERALIZATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS

(1986). A client,

when told that she faces the prospect of reporting lack of compliance to either a body of experts
within the CSCE or a body of experts within the OECD, might be understandably impatient

with an explanation that only the OECD rules constitute "law." (While the Moscow Document
omits words of legal obligation, the Code of Capital Movements explicitly states that is adopted
pursuant to the OECD Council's power to adopt legally binding decisions. See id. at 11.)
173. Compare the standards and recommended practices adopted in the International Civil
Aviation Organization, as described in THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 119-22 (1969) (concluding that the noncompulsory nature of ICAO regulation has made the organization more, not less, effective). The
critique that positivists usually ignore factors such as trust, fairness, credibility, and affiliation
is, of course, time-honored. See, e.g., REISMAN, supra note 155, at 281.
174. Compare DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 97 n.74, with id. at 98. Given the speed of
modern communications and the possibility of nearly instantenous reactions by States, including
through their reaction to a proposed resolution in the General Assembly, the need for the passage
of time as such appears irrelevant. For a review of the variety of approaches taken on this
question, see Anthony D'Amato, Customary Law Doctrine, in ANTHOLOGY, supra note 135,
at 63-64.
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"general" custom. 15 Though much of his analysis turns on a firm distinction between lex lata and lexferenda,7 6 he ultimately concedes that
such line-drawing is difficult, if not impossible. 77 Although he proclaims
that to be bound by custom, there must be evidence of both practice and
opinio juris and that individual States must be shown to have consented
with respect to each proposed rule of custom, it soon emerges not only
that "different areas of the law" require different types of scrutiny on these
issues, but also that sometimes practice and opinio juris may merge.'78
Given the uncertainties with respect to the rules which he purports to
find, it is ironic that Danilenko suggests that States which advocate new
sources of law, such as developing States, are motivated by a "desire to
avoid the specific requirements for law-making" required of article 38
sources. 179 Whether the use of, for example, General Assembly resolutions
as evidence of either individual State's opinio juris or as evidence of
community consensus, represents a less rigorous or more "relaxed" attitude
towards lawmaking than the (often contradictory) rules Danilenko advocates is disputable. Moreover, given the United States's and other powerful

175. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 127-28. Compare with ANTHOLOGY, supra note 135,

at 96, 236.
176. See, e.g., Danilenko's derision of "soft law." DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 20; see
also id. at 16.
177. Id. at 22, 133-34.
178. Id. at 103-09, 118-123 (as when the absence of protests might be taken to imply
"acquiescence" or when certain practice is taken as evidence of opiniojurisas well). Nor does
"acquiescence" require proof that the State in question was affirmatively aware of the legal
claims advanced. Because it is "assumed that states carefully watch all legal developments
within the international community, the requirement of knowledge does not presuppose any
official notifications of relevant legal claims." Id. at 108. Thus, Danilenko's supposedly
determinate elements of custom evaporate upon close inspection, and even he admits that "many
issues relating to custom formation remain controversial." Id. at 128. Given Danilenko's adamant
views concerning General Assembly resolutions (i.e., that they absolutely do not form a constitutive part of custom and cannot be used as evidence of a change in custom), the following oddity
appears to emerge: a "nothing" or nonaction which can (however artificially) be attributed to
one State as constituting "tacit acquiescence" constitutes greater evidence of a custom than the
consensus views of the entire international community expressed in an Assembly resolution.
Danilenko also takes his analysis to the logical conclusion: since unilateral statements evince
State practice, he indicates that a State's statements regarding an Assembly resolution (but of
course not the resolution itself) might have a "greater relevance." Id. at 122 n.158. It is
particularly at such times that Danilenko's analysis evokes D'Amato's description of positivism
as "equivalent to a program installed on a computer: the computer literally follows the
commands, whether or not they make sense." Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights and Natural
Law, in ANTHOLOGY, supra note 135, at 24.
179. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 19, 189. Similarly, given the uncertainties which
Danilenko himself uncovers with respect to the three accepted sources of law, it is odd that he
rejects community consensus as a mechanism for law generation because it is "lacking in
objectively determinable forms of manifestation." Id. at 202. One would have thought that a
concrete Assembly resolution adapted by consensus or by overwhelming recorded vote would
be far more determinate than "tacit acquiescence" based on a State's inaction over a legal claim
of which it may never have heard. See supra note 178.
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States' increasing resort to the Security Council and other institutionalized
mechanisms for lawmaking, 8 it is not clear today, if it ever was, that only
developing States favor a more "relaxed attitude towards questions of legal
form.''"" Danilenko ignores the possibility that resort to the Security
Council for the formation of rules, especially increasing resort to its
delegated power and its "powers of appreciation," may in the end present
and traditional sources of
greater strains on traditional notions of consent
82
law than resort to the General Assembly.
More generally, a critical problem with Danilenko's entire approach
to the subject of lawmaking is that, as has been said of Prosper Weil," a3
he ignores that what States do "and not what we want them to do constitutes international law."'1' 4 Reality, however ill-suited to preconceived
theory, should not be ignored. There is little point in bemoaning "soft
law" if States want to make it. 8 5 General principles of law, if actually
used by States and courts, cannot be minimized as a source of law because
we have disagreements about its content, nor can law generated by
international and domestic courts be ignored if it occurs. Nor perhaps need
we adhere to doctrines such as "persistent objector," however appealing
from the perspective of consensual theory, in the face of little evidence
that such objectors actually exist.8 6 If States, contrary to Danilenko's

180. See supra note 124.
181. Danilenko, supra note 4, at 19. Nor is it still the case, if it ever was, that developing
States "favor universal approaches to all major community problems." Id. at 273.
182. Thus, developing States, in particular, are casting doubt on the legitimacy and legality
of the Security Council's acts and especially on its representative nature. Some of these States
would no doubt favor a return to Danilenko's world where the rules are generated only through
treaty and custom and not through the supranational powers of international organizations. See
Report of Secretary General, supra note 110 (reporting on Security Council size).
183. See, e.g., CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 85-86 (Antonio
Cassese & Joseph H.H. Weiler eds., 1988) [hereinafter CHANGE AND STABILITY]; Anthony
D'Amato, A Brief Response, in ANTHOLOGY, supra note 135, at 153.
184. Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1110, 1148 (1982).
185. For an insightful look at why States may want to do so, see Charles Lipson, Why are
Some InternationalAgreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495 (1991). For a particular example
of States' resort to "soft law" to overcome negotiating deadlocks, see Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft InternationalLaw of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1983).
186. Danilenko affirms the existence of the persistent doctrine on the basis of apparent
endorsement of the principle in the Fisheries Case. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 112. But see
Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary
InternationalLaw, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1985). He gets around the inconvenient absence
of actual examples of the use of such a doctrine by States by arguing that "political realities
... inevitably affect its practice." DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 112. Yet the point of other
portions of his book are precisely that mere affirmations of a principle by the ICJ are worthless
unless the rules enunciated are supported by the actual actions of States, i.e., political reality.
See, e.g., id. at 122-23 (criticizing ICJ's view that certain acts leading to the adoption of treaties
can express opiniojuris), 188-89 (criticizing views that the General Assembly can recognize
general principles of law).
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preferences, decide to promulgate rules of general custom through
networks of bilateral treaties or through multilateral agreements which do
not originally indicate a codification intent, lawyers may need to reform
their concept of treaties and custom to accomodate changing needs." 7
Despite the inelegance of today's multifarious and sometimes inconsistent
modes for international lawmaking, lawyers have to adapt theory to
changing realities; otherwise, their unreal conception of the law risks
discrediting the very notion of law. 188 While Danilenko may be correct to
worry about the resulting normative confusion and uncertainty, his
summary of preferred rules governing sources of law does not promote
confidence that these rules are any less imprecise, inconsistent, or uncertain. 8 9 Danilenko might well consider, as Oscar Schachter has noted,
that "international law is more appropriately viewed as an institution than
as a set of rules," that is, that international lawmaking is less a code than
a process.19
III. THE VIRTUES OF BEING POSITIVE
Critics of traditional international law, such as Martti Koskenniemi,
would not be surprised by the flaws in this book. As Koskenniemi has
written, the doctrine of sources has always had a fundamentally inconsistent dual agenda.
On the one hand, it tries to provide for the concreteness of the law
by refusing to accept any norms as simply given, either by virtue of
statehood or some anterior normative code. It tells the lawyer where

187. Cf. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 51, 123. Bilateral treaty possibilities here include
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), treaties on mutual assistance, and extradition. See, e.g., G.A.
Res. 116, U.N, GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 100, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1991)
(endorsing a model treaty on extradition); G.A. Res. 117, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item
100, U.N. Doc. AIRES/45/117 (1991) (endorsing a model treaty on mutual assistance). For
background to the U.S. BITs, see K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Comments on Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus.

105 (1986). Similarly, if custom is now being generated through the conscious, sometimes
rapid, action of international organizations, lawyers may have to modify their view of that source
of law as slow to evolve, difficult to change. Compare G.M. Danilenko, The Theory of
Customary InternationalLaw, 31 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. at 13 (1988), with CHANGE
AND STABILITY, supra note 183, at 1-4, 12-14.
LAW.

188. Reisman, InternationalIncidents, in ANTHOLOGY, supra note 135, at 56.

189. For a recent attempt to canvass the inadequacies of article 38, see G. H. Guttal,
Sources of InternationalLaw: Contemporary Trends, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TRANSITION
(R.S. Pathak & R.P. Dhokalia eds., 1992). Cf. Zamora, supra note 21, at 42 ("the law/non-law
dichotomy may be too simple to explain the role of international economic law in a post-Bretton
Woods world").
190. Oscar Schachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International
Society, in STRUCTURE AND PROCESS, supra note 1, at 744, 746 [hereinafter Schachter, Nature
and Process] .
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he can find the law in an objective fashion. On the other hand,
sources doctrine also attempts to provide for the law's objectivity by
detaching it from the momentary views and interpretations which
states might hold of its content. The doctrine of sources includes an
gj
attempt to reconcile the law's concreteness with its normativity.1
From Koskenniemi's perspective, Danilenko is trying, by defending his
article 38 totem, to reconcile the irreconcilable: he is at one and the same
time: (1) telling us what States actually accept as lawmaking processes;
and (2) using the article 38 processes as an "independent methodology
which can produce normatively constraining results."' 192 Thus, Danilenko
tells us, for example, not only that States in fact do not accept Assembly
resolutions as independent sources of law, but also that any examples to
the contrary are dangerously consistent with the accepted sources of article
38 and therefore should not "count." From Koskenniemi's critical perspective then, the above critiques of Danilenko's approach are obvious, if not
beside the point. An argument that Danilenko's view of lawmaking is
terribly incomplete is a critique based on the contrary evidence of what
States and other actors are actually doing in the real world. It is essentially
an attack on Danilenko's utopianism. On the other hand, the attacks on
the vagueness and inconsistencies of Danilenko's proposed rules for
lawmaking are attacks on the apologist strands of his analysis; Danilenko's
attempt to take into account the actual inconsistencies in the practice of
States exposes him to the charge.
The central message of Martti Koskenniemi's analysis of sources
doctrine - which can be taken as the polar opposite of Danilenko's is that the doctrine of sources, like all other fundamental notions of modem international law, is based on the false notion that law need be and
can be made separate from politics. On the contrary, argues Koskenniemi,
the doctrine of sources, like all of international law, is subjective and
manipulable along the spectrum from apologism for State action to
utopianism. 93 From his perspective, both Danilenko's analysis and the
above critique are pious frauds: the fruitlessness of the underlying task to give certainty and stability to a doctrine which is fundamentally
uncertain and unstable - serves only to make clearer those basic strains
which always existed within international law.

191.

KOSKENNIEMI,

supra note 2, at 264.

192. Id. at 266; see also Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of InternationalLaw, 1 EUR.

J.

INT'L

L. 4, 20-27 (1990) [hereinafter Koskienniemi, Politics of InternationalLaw].

193. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 2, at 264-341.
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One can accept Koskenniemi's view, embarking on an approach to
international law which does not rely on any doctrine of sources of law
whatsoever - a concept of law not premised on "false objectivity," that
does not seek to make the law relatively autonomous from politics. 9 4 It
is clear, however, even from Koskenniemi's own work, that that millennium has not yet arrived. 95 Further, it is not clear what the role of lawyers
would be were we to cease our "flight from politicS.' ' 196 As Koskenniemi
has himself indicated, and despite the progress of regulation by international organizations, sovereign States remain key actors in international
lawmaking and, notwithstanding the criticisms suggested previously, their
"consent" (however ill-defined) remains important to the legitimacy and
efficacy of international law.' 97
To that extent then, Danilenko's work is an honest' 98 attempt to deal
with these realities, which have not fundamentally changed since 1945
despite the end of the Cold War. Danilenko's sole indirect reference to
the critical theorists who have posed the most thorough critique to the
entire positivist framework deployed in his book is revealing. "It is
submitted," Danilenko writes, "that the acknowledgment of the problem
of indeterminacy of legal norms in certain areas of law should result not
in the total destruction of the traditional tests of validity, but in their
further refinement and elaboration."' 199 Koskenniemi's description of the
dual role of sources might be accurate, yet provoke no rush to abandon
the concept of sources precisely because, for the time being at least,
international lawyers and their clients continue to believe such refinement
and elaboration is, Koskenniemi's arguments notwithstanding, desirable,
necessary, and possible. Most international lawyers still want to pursue
the enterprise which drives Danilenko: we still feel the need to distinguish,
at least in relative terms, "legal" norms from "political" or morally

194. Cf.Schachter, Nature and Process, supra note 190, at 747 (arguing that law must

remain relatively autonomous from politics).
195. Indeed, Koskenniemi's effort in From Apology to Utopia, KOSKENNIEMI, supra note

2, is designed to critique prevailing modes of thought. See also Martti Koskenniemi, The Future
of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 397 (1991) (affirming the continued viability of a State-

centric system) [hereinafter Koskenniemi, Future of Statehood].
196. Koskenniemi, Politics of InternationalLaw, supra note 192, at 4. After nearly 500
pages of criticism of international legal doctrine, Martti Koskenniemi's Apology to Utopia

devotes a scant ten pages to alternatives which go 'beyond objectivism." KOSKENNIEMI, supra
note 2, at 490-501.
197. See, e.g., Koskenniemi, Future of Statehood, supra note 195.

198. It cannot be said that Danilenko does not make clear his explicit value preferences:
order, stability, certainty.
199. DANILENKO, supra note 4, at 302.
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desirable norms. 200 And that need is not likely to disappear anytime soon
- not while the system of international law continues to rely nearly
exclusively on its own perceived legitimacy for effectiveness, rather than
the force of arms or enactment by legislature, executive, or judiciary. For
the foreseeable future it appears that States and other actors in international relations need to continue to believe that a "rule of law" either exists
or can be made to appear to exist. They need to continue to believe that
such legal rules are relatively distinguishable from arguments based on
fundamental fairness or morality, have a definitive "either/or" quality, are
subject to a self-contained system of rules about the rules - including
circumscribed rules on interpretation - and that, faithfully applied, are
capable of generating stability, certainty, and even perhaps, justice. At
least to this extent, Danilenko's agenda - to seek to identify the secondary rules for perpetuating that rule of law - continues to have validity.
Indeed, in a world creating ever more methods for international regulation,
perhaps even undergoing a "paradigm-shift, ' 201 the need for continuous
but critical re-examination of the sources of regulation appears salutary
and even vital.

200. But that view is now under attack, not just by critical legal scholars like Martti

Koskenniemi, but also by unrepentant natural lawyers. See Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian
Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992) (arguing for an international
jurisprudence congruent with principles of domestic justice).
201.

Cf.THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970)

(discussing paradigms in the history of science) and Shabtai Rosenne, The Role of Controversy
in International Legal Development, in STRUCTURE AND PROCESS, supra note 1, at 1147 (indicating pervasive strains in State-centric international law doctrine).

